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In the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities, wage setters take into account the future
consequences of their current wage choices, when facing both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks.
We derive a closed-form solution for a long-run Phillips curve which relates average output gap
WRaverage wage inflation: it is virtually vertical at high inflation and flattens at low inflation.
Macroeconomicvolatility shifts the curve outward and reduces output. The results imply that
stabilization policiesplay an important role, and that optimal inflation may be positive and differ across
countrieswith differentmacroeconomic volatility.
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This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of downward nominal wage rigidi-
ties in a low in°ation environment via a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
where forward-looking agents optimally set their wages under the downward constraint.
A closed-form solution for the long-run Phillips curve is derived. The in°ation-output
gap trade-o® is virtually vertical at high in°ation and °attens at low in°ation, implying
progressively larger output costs of reducing in°ation. Macroeconomic volatility (among
other factors) shifts the curve outwards, generating output and employment costs, and
suggesting the need for stabilization policies. The trade-o® declines with the degree of
wage °exibility but remains non-negligible.
The conventional view argues against the presence of a long-run trade-o® and in favor
of price stability: the attempt to take advantage of the short-run trade-o® would only
generate costly in°ation in the long run, so that price stability should be the objective of
central banks.1 Recent monetary models exhibit a long-run relationship between in°ation
and real activity, mainly due to symmetric nominal rigidities and asynchronized time-
dependent price-setting behavior in an intertemporal setup (see among others Goodfriend
and King, 1997, and Woodford, 2003).2 Nonetheless, this literature indicates that the
optimal long-run in°ation rate should be close to zero and unemployment at the natural
rate.3 However, virtually no central bank adopts a policy of zero-in°ation, and the two
traditional reasons relate to the zero nominal interest bound and the presence of downward
nominal rigidities.
This paper emphasizes the role of the downward nominal rigidities, quite a novel fea-
ture in the aforementioned literature.4 The traditional view suggests that a lower bound
on wages and prices keeps them from falling and induces a drift: a negative demand
shock would just reduce in°ation if in°ation remains positive, but would reduce output
and employment if prices needed to fall. Price stability could be achieved only at sub-
stantial costs in terms of output and employment, thus entailing signi¯cant bene¯ts from
\greasing" the labor market via in°ation. An extensive discussion is o®ered by Akerlof et
1After the seminal contributions of Phillips (1958) and Samuelson and Solow (1960), various authors
have cast serious doubts on the validity of the Phillips curve (Friedman, 1968, and Lucas, 1973). The
empirical controversy has yet to settled down (see Ball et al., 1988).
2State-dependent pricing (Golosov and Lucas, 2007) would weaken the long-run relationship, as price
rigidities would no longer be binding at high in°ation. For a recent critical survey see Blanchard (2008).
3Because in°ation would induce ¯rms to set a high markup to protect future pro¯ts, and would create
costly price dispersion (see Khan, King and Wolman, 2003, and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004). See
Wyplosz (2001) for an empirical analysis on this topic.
4Since Keynes, numerous authors (for example, Tobin, 1972, and Akerlof, 2007) stressed their impor-
tance for the existence of a trade-o® between in°ation and unemployment.
1al. (1996), who derive a trade-o® between unemployment and in°ation via a static model
with downward wage rigidities.
There is now a strong body of microeconometric evidence indicating the presence of
downward wage rigidities across a wide spectrum of countries, often even at low in°ation.5
Recent studies, some based on cross-country evidence, ¯nd that downward wage rigidities
have a negative impact on employment (Dickens et al., 2008, and Messina et al., 2008,
Knoppik and Beissinger, 2003). Indeed, while Card and Hyslop (1997) ¯nd only a weak
evidence in favor of a \grease" e®ect of in°ation for the U.S., Loboguerrero and Panizza
(2006) ¯nd that the \grease" e®ect of in°ation is more relevant in countries with highly
regulated labor markets, in line with the fact that wage rigidities are stronger in countries
with heavier labor market distortions (Holden, 2004, and Dickens et al., 2007). The
e®ect of downward rigidities is potentially a contributor to recent U.S. labor market
developments: annual growth rate in private industry total compensation declined only
from about 3% in the ¯rst quarter of 2008 to about 1.5% in the last quarter of 2009, while
unemployment rose from about 5% to 10% over the same period.
In this paper, we introduce downward wage rigidities in an otherwise dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model with forward-looking optimizing agents that enjoy consump-
tion of goods and experience disutility from labor when working for pro¯t-maximizing
¯rms. Labor markets are characterized by monopolistic competition, goods markets are
perfectly competitive, and goods prices are fully °exible. The economy is subject to both
idiosyncratic sectorial shocks and aggregate shocks (to productivity and nominal spend-
ing), which generate the need for both intratemporal (as in the traditional discussion of
the Phillips curve) and intertemporal price adjustments. Extensions to the benchmark
model relax and endogenize the downward rigidity constraint, in part to address concerns
about the empirical relevance of wage rigidities at low in°ation.6 Indeed, even if we allow
the degree of downward rigidities to vary across agents, or with in°ation and macroeco-
nomic volatility, or following large shocks, the in°ation-output trade-o® remains sizable
for reasonable parametrizations of the model.
The most important novelties of our contribution are the derivation of a closed-form
5See for example Lebow et al. (2003), Dickens et al. (2007) and Du Caju et al. (2008), and numerous
references cited by Akerlof (2007, footnote 61) and Holden (2004, section V). Gottschalk (2004) and
Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2009) ¯nd that measurement error in wages reported in surveys may
even lead to a substantial underestimation of the extent of downward wage rigidity. Several explanations
have been put forward for the existence of such rigidities, such as fairness, social norms, and labor market
institutions (see, for example, Bewley, 1999, and Holden, 2004).
6Several authors (see Ball and Mankiw, 1994, and the comments to Akerlof et al., 1996) have conjec-
tured that downward wage rigidities may vanish in a low in°ation environment. However, recent evidence
shows that even at lor in°ation such rigidities are binding (Agell and Lundborg, 2003, for Sweden; Fehr
and Gotte, 2005, for Switzerland; Yasui and Takenaka, 2005, for Japan).
2solution for a non-linear relationship between the long-run averages of wage in°ation and
output gap (the long-run Phillips curve), and the derivation of how such a curve would
shift outward with macroeconomic volatility.7 The output-in°ation trade-o® °attens at
low in°ation, a result which suggests that the °attening of the Phillips curve observed in
several industrial countries in recent years may not need to be ascribed to globalization
(see IMF, 2006; Borio and Filardo, 2006), but may simply be due to the decline in in°ation.
The results also suggest that the possible end of the Great Moderation coupled with low
in°ation{if not de°ation{may in°ict a compounded negative e®ect on the economy, which
would substantially reduce output and employment unless o®set by more wage °exibility,
stronger stabilization policies, or higher productivity growth.
The policy implications are quite di®erent from those o®ered by standard monetary
models. First, the optimal in°ation may not be zero (as recently argued) or negative (as
suggested by Friedman, 1968). Moderate in°ation may help "grease" intratemporal and
intertemporal relative price adjustments, especially in countries with substantial macroe-
conomic volatility. Second, not every country should target the same in°ation rate, but
those experiencing larger volatility may ¯nd it desirable to target a higher in°ation rate.
Third, as the degree of volatility changes persistently over time, the in°ation target may
need to be adjusted. Fourth, policymakers can improve the output-in°ation trade-o® via
stabilization policies aimed at reducing macroeconomic volatility, thus lowering the output
and employment costs of maintaining low in°ation or of reducing it. This result contrasts
with the view that the gains from stabilization policies are negligible (as in Lucas 1987,
2003). Simulations based on the model presented in this paper indicate that an advanced
economy enjoying a low macroeconomic volatility (say 2%) and low in°ation (say 2%)
might face a long run output gap of minus 1:2%. The end of the Great Moderation (say
bringing macroeconomic volatility to 5%) might widen this estimate to minus 1:6%.
Beside the work of Akerlof et al. (1996), our paper is related to a few recent con-
tributions. Elsby (2009) o®ers a partial equilibrium model where downward nominal
rigidities arise from negative e®ects of wage cuts on ¯rm's productivity, and highlights
the endogenous tendency for upward rigidity of wages in a dynamic model. Kim and
Ruge-Murcia (2007), and more recently Fahr and Smets (2008) and Fagan and Messina
(2008), present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric costs
to wage adjustments, but do not derive a closed-form solution for the long-run Phillips
curve.8
7An equivalent formulation in terms of in°ation and unemployment is o®ered in Benigno and Ricci
(2008).
8Andersen (2001) presents a static model which can be solved in a closed form, while Bhaskar (2003)
o®ers a framework that endogenizes downward price rigidities. Our model also shares similarities with
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sections 3 and
4 present the solutions under °exible and downward-rigid wages, respectively. Section
5 solves for the long-run Phillips curve. Section 6 relaxes the degree of wage rigidities.
Section 7 draws conclusions.
2 The model
The closed-economy model is populated by a continuum of in¯nitely lived households and
sectors (both in a [0,1] interval). Each household derives utility from the consumption of a
continuum of goods and disutility from supplying a continuum of varieties of labor, which
are speci¯c to the households and to the sector in which they are employed. The model
assumes the presence of downward nominal rigidities: wages are chosen by optimizing
households under the constraint that they cannot fall (this assumption will be relaxed in
Section 6). In each sector, ¯rms operate in a competitive market to produce one of the
continuum of consumption goods. The economy is subject to two aggregate shocks: a
productivity and a nominal spending shock. The productivity shock is denoted by At;
whose logarithmic at is distributed as a Brownian motion with drift g and variance ¾2
a
dat = gdt + ¾adBa;t (1)
where Ba;t denotes a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit variance. The
nominal spending shock is denoted by ~ Yt whose logarithmic ~ yt is also distributed as a
Brownian motion, now with drift µ and variance ¾2
y
d~ yt = µdt + ¾ydBy;t (2)
where dBy;t is a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit variance that might
be correlated with dBa;t.
The economy is also subject to a continuum of idiosyncratic preference shocks that
a®ect directly the disutility of supplying the varieties of labor among the di®erent sec-
tors. The logarithmic value of each shock »t(i); with i belonging to the [0,1] interval, is
distributed as a Brownian motion with zero drift and variance ¾2
»(i)
dln»t(i) = ¾»(i)dB»;t(i) (3)
where dB»;t(i) is a standard Brownian motion with zero drift and unit variance that might
the literature on irreversible investment (see, among others, Bertola and Caballero, 1994).
4be correlated across the di®erent i and is instead uncorrelated with dBy;t and dBa;t. We
assume that idiosyncratic shocks cancel out at the aggregate level, i.e.
Z 1
0
ln»t(i) = 0: (4)



















where the expectation operator Et0(¢) is de¯ned by the shock processes (1), (2) and (3),
and ½ > 0 is the rate of time preference. Current utility depends on the consumption










t(i) is household j's consumption of the variety of good i produced in the respective




where pt(i) is the price of the single good i.
The utility °ow is logarithmic in the consumption aggregate. Given (5), each household
j supplies a continuum of varieties of labor, each speci¯c to a sector i of the economy.
Hence, lt(j;i) is the variety of labor supplied by household j to sector i. The disutility
of exerting labor e®orts is separable across the di®erent varieties i and assumed to be
isoelastic with ´ ¸ 0 measuring the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply; the
shock »t(i) a®ects in a multiplicative way the disutility that household j faces when
supplying the variety of labor (j;i) to sector i.9 Household j's intertemporal budget





















where Qt is the stochastic nominal discount factor in capital markets where claims to
monetary units are traded; wt(j;i) is the nominal wage for labor of variety (j;i) o®ered
by household j; and ¦
j
t is the pro¯t income that household j derives from the ownership
9These preferences are consistent with a balanced-growth path since we are assuming a drift in tech-
nology.
5of the ¯rms operating in the economy (in equilibrium, pro¯ts will be zero).
Starting with the consumption decisions, household j chooses goods demand, fc
j
t(i)g;
to maximize (5) under the intertemporal budget constraint (7), taking prices as given.













where the multiplier Â does not vary over time. The index j is omitted from the con-
sumption's ¯rst-order conditions, because we are assuming complete markets through a
set of state-contingent claims to monetary units. The optimality condition (9) implies the
equalization of the consumption expenditure among the di®erent goods.
Before we turn to the labor supply decision, we analyze the ¯rms' problem. In each
sector i; ¯rms produce goods in a competitive market using the varieties of labor i supplied
by the continuum of household j: However, each household j has a monopoly power in
supplying each variety (j;i) of labor. In particular the labor used to produce each good i












with an elasticity of substitution µ > 1. Here ld
t(j;i) is the demand for labor of type i
supplied by household j. As the production function of each sector i exhibits \love for
variety" in types of labor j, every household sells labor to every sector. Given that each
di®erentiated type of labor is supplied in a monopolistic-competitive market, the demand


















6We assume a common linear technology for the production of all goods10
yt(i) = AtLt(i):
Pro¯ts of a generic ¯rm in sector i, ¦t(i), are given by
¦t(i) = pt(i)yt(i) ¡ Wt(i)Lt(i):





Since in equilibrium y(i) = c(i), the conditions (9) and (12) imply the following equalities
~ Yt = PtCt = pt(i)yt(i) = Wt(i)Lt(i); (13)
where ~ Yt denotes nominal spending whose logarithmic follows the process (2).
Given ¯rms' demand (10), a household of type j chooses labor supply of variety (j;i)
in a monopolistic-competitive market to maximize (5) under the intertemporal budget
constraint (7) taking as given prices fQtg; fPtg and the other relevant aggregate variables.













where ¸t is the marginal utility of nominal income, which is common across households
because of the complete market assumption and given by ¸t = (PtCt)¡1 = ~ Y
¡1
t : An


























Households would then supply as much labor as demanded by ¯rms in (10) at the chosen
10Sector-speci¯c technology would leave all results unchanged.
7wages. In deriving ¼(¢) we have used (8), (10) and (13).11 Note that ¼(¢) is homogeneous
of degree zero in (wt(j;i), Wt(i), ~ Yt(i)), and that ~ Yt(i) is the product of the nominal
spending shock and the sectorial idiosyncratic shock (~ Yt(i) ´ ~ Yt»t(i)).
3 Flexible wages
We ¯rst analyze the case in which wages are set without any friction, so that they can be
moved freely and fall if necessary. With °exible wages, maximization of (14) corresponds
to per-period maximization and implies the following optimality condition
¼w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) = 0
where ¼w(¢) is the derivative of ¼(¢) with respect to the ¯rst argument. Since all wage
setters in sector i face the same problem, the equilibrium is symmetric, wt(j;i) = Wt(i) for
each j: Given our preference speci¯cation, nominal wages in sector i, denoted by W
f
t (i);




t (i) = ¹
1
1+´ ~ Yt»t(i) (15)
where the factor of proportionality is given by the wage mark-up, de¯ned by ¹ ´ µ=(µ¡1),
and by the elasticity of labor supply. We can also obtain the °exible-wage equilibrium






which depends on the wage mark-up as well as on the labor elasticity and is negatively










11The productivity shock At does not enter in the objective function because of three assumptions:
i) the log utility in consumption, which is compatible with a balanced-growth path; ii) the °exibility
of prices (which allow us to isolate the e®ect of the downward rigidity constraint in wages); iii) the
exogeneity of the process of nominal spending (notice that assumptions i) and iii) are also in Golosov
and Lucas, 2007). Productivity would of course a®ect the optimization problem insofar as it in°uence
nominal spending growth. Adding menu cost pricing would enrich the model and would open the way
for an additional e®ect of productivity.
8because of the assumption (4). Note that aggregate labor does not depend on the produc-
tivity shock, because of the log-utility, and does not depend on the idiosyncratic shocks,










Consumption and output follow from the production function and in particular the °exible





which moves proportionally to the productivity shock. With °exible wages and prices,
output is always at potential and the Phillips curve is vertical.
4 Downward nominal wage rigidity
When nominal wages cannot fall below the level reached in the previous period, an ad-
ditional condition needs to be taken into account: the constraint that dwt(j;i) should be
non-negative (Section 6 explores alternative models).12 The objective is then to maximize
(14) under
dwt(j;i) ¸ 0 (16)
with wt0(j;i) > 0. In other words, agents choose a non-decreasing positive nominal wage
path to maximize (14): Let us de¯ne the value function V (¢) for this problem as









where W is the set of non-decreasing positive sequences fw¿(j;i)g1
t . Optimality condi-
tions require
Vw(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) = 0 if dwt(j;i) > 0;
Vw(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) · 0 if dwt(j;i) = 0;
where Vw(¢) is the derivative of V (¢) with respect to the ¯rst argument. Moreover the
maximization problem is concave and the above conditions are also su±cient to charac-
terize a global optimum as shown in the appendix. It follows that all wage setters in
sector i are going to set the same wage, wt(j;i) = Wt(i) for all j: As we further show
12The downward-rigidity constraint is purely exogenous in this model and could be rationalized by
considering every worker as associated with a union that does not allow the wage to decline for reasons
related to fairness and social norms (Bewley, 1999, and Akerlof, 2007).
9in the appendix, the solution to this problem corresponds to ¯nding a function W(~ Yt(i))
which satis¯es appropriate boundary conditions and represents the current desired wage
taking into account future downward-rigidity constraints, but not the current one (i.e. if
agents were free to choose the current wage, even below the previous-period wage, but
considering that future wages cannot fall). The agent will set Wt(i) = W(~ Yt(i)) whenever
dWt(i) ¸ 0, so that actual wages (Wt(i)) are the maximum of previous-period wages and
current desired wages W(~ Yt(i)).
It follows that actual wages cannot fall below current desired wages, i.e. Wt ¸
W(~ Yt(i)): Either they are above the desired level, when the downward-rigidity constraint
is binding, or they are equal, when an adjustment occurs. We also show that the desired
wage is always lower than the °exible-equilibrium wage by a factor ci(¢):13
W(~ Yt(i)) = c(µ;¾
2(i);´;½) ¢ ¹
1





where ¾2(i) (a crucial parameter in our model) is de¯ned as the sum of the variances of
the aggregate nominal spending shocks and the idiosyncratic shocks, ¾2(i) ´ ¾2
»(i) + ¾2
y;


















as derived in the appendix.14
Hence, agents' optimizing behavior in the presence of exogenous downward wage rigidi-
ties implies an endogenous tendency for upward wage rigidities, as indicated by ci(¢) being
· 1. Indeed, optimizing wage setters try to o®set the ine±ciencies of downward wage in-
°exibility, as they are worried about being stuck with an excessively high wage should
future unfavorable shocks require a wage decline or a fall in employment. As a conse-
quence, they refrain from excessive wage increases when favorable shocks require upward
13We use interchangeably ci(¢) for c(µ;¾2(i);´;½).
14It is possible that the desired wage, W(~ Yt(i)); falls below the one associated with full employment.
While temporary overemployment is not unrealistic, in Benigno and Ricci (2008) we also solve the model
with the additional constraint lt(j;i) · 1 for each j.

















Figure 1: Plot of the function ci(¢) de¯ned in (17) against the mean of nominal spending
growth, µ; and for di®erent standard deviations of ¾(i) where ¾2(i) = ¾2
y +¾2
»(i); ¾y is the
standard deviation of nominal spending growth and ¾»(i) is the standard deviation of the
idiosyncratic shock. µ and ¾(i) are in percent and at annual rates; ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01.
adjustment, thus keeping current wage low and pushing current employment above the
°exible-case level.15
Note that actual wages (unlike desired wages) are not necessarily below the °exible-
equilibrium wage. Indeed, when the downward-rigidity constraint is binding, actual wages
are higher than desired wages and are likely to be higher (and employment lower) than
with °exible wages. As we will see in the next section, in the long run, the average output
gap is negative and a lower ci(¢) would help reduce its size.
The desired wage level is a lower fraction of the °exible-equilibrium wage (i.e. ci(¢)
is low) when: the variances of nominal expenditure growth and/or of the idiosyncratic
shocks are high (¾2(i) large), as it is more likely that negative shocks would force wages
to hit the lower bound; when the mean of nominal expenditure growth is small (µ small),
as it is more likely that even small shocks would push wages to hit the lower bound;16
15This result is consistent with the theoretical argument and empirical evidence o®ered by Elsby (2009).
While he emphasizes the importance of idiosyncratic shocks, we also stress the importance of macroeco-
nomics volatility.
16When the drift in nominal spending growth becomes very large, it is unlikely that downward wage
in°exibility is going to be binding, so that ci(¢) gets close to 1 and the °exible-wage level of employment
11when agents discount less the future (½ low), as they are more concerned with the future
negative consequences of current wage decisions; and when the elasticity of labor is higher
(´ low), as agents are willing to accept larger °uctuations in hours worked in order to
ensure a higher average employment.
In Figure 1 we plot ci(¢) as a function of the mean of the log of nominal spending
growth, µ; with di®erent assumptions on the overall standard deviation of the shocks,
¾(i), ranging from 0% to 20% at annual rates. The parameters' calibration is based on a
discretized quarterly model. In particular, the rate of time preference ½ is equal to 0:01 as
standard in the literature implying a 4% real interest rate at annual rates; and the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is set equal to 0:4, as it is done in several studies, therefore
implying ´ = 2:5.17 When ¾(i) = 0%, ci(¢) = 1. With positive standard deviations,
ci(¢) decreases as µ decreases (i.e. the gap between desired wages and °exible-equilibrium
wages widens when in°ation is lower). The decline in ci(¢) is larger the higher is the
standard deviation of the nominal spending shock and/or of the idiosyncratic shock, as
previously discussed.
5 The Phillips curve
We can now solve for the equilibrium level of output and characterize the long run
in°ation-output trade-o® in the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities. We de¯ne
the output gap as the di®erence between output under downward wage rigidity and output
under °exible wages and prices, which is equal to the di®erence between the corresponding
employment levels. In logs terms we can write:
yt ¡ y
f











To compute the equilibrium output gap, it is convenient to de¯ne the variable Xt(i) such







will be achieved most of the time.
17See for example Smets and Wouters (2003).





Since we have shown that Wt(i) ¸ ci(¢)¹
1
1+´ ~ Yt(i); it is the case that 0 · Xt(i) · Lf=ci(¢):
The existence of downward wage rigidities endogenously adds an upward barrier on the
variable Xt(i). Since ~ yt(i) ´ ln ~ Yt(i) follows a Brownian motion with drift µ and variance
¾2(i); also xt(i) = lnXt(i) is going to follow a Brownian motion with the same properties;
when dWt(i) = 0, but with a regulating barrier at ln(Lf=ci(¢)). The probability distri-
bution function for such process can be computed at each point in time.18 We are here
interested in studying whether this probability distribution converges to an equilibrium
distribution when t ! 1, in order to characterize the long-run probability distribution
for employment, and thus the output gap. Standard results assure that this is the case
when the drift of the process ~ yt(i) is positive, i.e. µ > 0.19 In this case, it can be shown
that the long-run cumulative distribution of xt(i), denoted with P(¢); is given by
P(x1(i) · z) = e
2µ
¾2(i)[z¡(lnLf¡lnci)]
for ¡1 · z · ln(Lf=ci(¢)) where x1(i) denotes the long-run equilibrium level of the
variable xt(i). We can also evaluate the long-run mean of xt(i) obtaining
E[x1(i)] = lnL






























To construct the long-run Phillips curve, a relationship between average wage in°ation
and output gap, we need to solve for the long-run equilibrium level of wage in°ation.20
18See Cox and Miller (1990, pp. 223-225) for a detailed derivation.
19When µ · 0, the probability distribution collapses to zero everywhere, with a spike of one at zero
employment. However, a negative average nominal spending growth, µ, is not realistic.
20While the original formulation of the Phillips curve was in terms of unemployment and wage in°ation















where ¼w is the rate of wage in°ation in the economy. Since E(d~ yt) = µdt and dxt(i)
converges to an equilibrium distribution for each i, implying E(dx1(i)) = 0, the long-run
mean wage in°ation rate is given by
E[¼
w
1] = µ: (22)

















a relation between mean output gap and mean wage in°ation rate.
The long-run Phillips curve is no longer vertical and the \natural" rate of output is not
unique, but depends on the mean in°ation rate. There are two components (in°uenced
by the parameters of the model ´; ½ and ¾2(i)) which explain the long-run Phillips curve
and act on opposite directions. The ¯rst integral on the right hand side captures the
forward looking reaction of wage setters to the presence of downward wage rigidities,
which induces them to set a wage lower than the °exible one when adjusting their wage
(as captured by ci(¢) · 1), and hence generates a positive output gap. Such a gap would
be larger the lower is ci(¢). The second integral depends on the variance-to-mean ratio
and captures the cost of downward wage rigidities in the presence of a need for relative
price adjustments, which is the standard argument supporting the presence of a Phillips
curve.21
The resulting output gap is always non-positive in the long run (i.e. E(y1¡yf
1) · 0),
(Phillips, 1958), this paper de¯nes it as the trade o® between the output gap and wage in°ation. The
output gap has indeed been widely used in modern macro models as a measure of slack. Benigno and
Ricci (2008) present the equivalent formulation in terms of unemployment-in°ation trade-o®.
21Note that our dynamic framework introduces not only the need for intratemporal price adjustments,
due to ¾2
»(i), as in Akerlof et al. (1996), but also the need for intertemporal price adjustment, arising
from ¾2
y.
14because the second component dominates, since ¡lnci(¢) · ¾2(i)=(2E[¼w
1]). 22Also, the
output gap is larger when the volatility is higher and when the mean of in°ation is low,
because the downward wage constraint is more likely to be binding and more costly in
terms of lower employment. Indeed, when the mean wage in°ation rate becomes very high,
the average output gap converges to 0, as the two components of the gap get close to zero:
ci(¢) becomes close to 1; and the costs of downward rigidities become small. Hence, for
high in°ation rates, the Phillips curve is almost vertical, and there is virtually no long-
run trade-o® between in°ation and output gap. When instead wage in°ation is low, a
trade-o® emerges (the Phillips curve is °atter) and depends heavily on the volatility of
the economy. If there is no uncertainty, ¾2(i) = 0 and ci(¢) = 1; then the long-run output
gap is zero. In the stochastic case, the higher the variance of nominal-spending growth
and of the idiosyncratic shocks (¾2(i)), the more a fall in the in°ation rate would worsen
the average output gap (generating a more negative gap), and °atten the Phillips curve.23
These patterns are evident in Figure 2, which plots the long run Phillips curve for di®erent
levels of volatility.24
As an illustrative example, the model would suggest (on the basis of the parametriza-
tion underlying Figure 2) that a country that is subject to low macroeconomic volatility
(say a standard deviation of nominal GDP growth equal to 2%) may experience a wors-
ening of the output gap equal to 0.4% of °exible-wage GDP when average wage in°ation
declines from 6 to 3 percent and equal to 4.6% when in°ation goes from 4 to 1 percent
(see Table 1). However, a country with a signi¯cant macroeconomic volatility (say 10
percent) may face much larger costs (about -1.2% and of -11.8% respectively).25
Our model therefore suggests that a reduction in the macroeconomic volatility as a
consequence of better stabilization policies can have important ¯rst-order e®ects, unlike
the arguments of Lucas (1987, 2003), and substantially improve the output gap, especially
at low in°ation (as shown in Table 2). At a wage in°ation rate of 2%, reducing the
macroeconomic volatility from 5% to 0% improves the output gap by about 0.5%. The
22Benigno and Ricci (2008) show that in the short run the Phillips curve may also imply a positive
(rather than negative) output gap.
23In Lucas (1973) higher volatility reduces the information content of relative price dispersion. Intro-
ducing such an e®ect would steepens the short-run Phillips curve.
24The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks is set at 10% for all sectors, such that (for a ¾y
in the order of 5% to 10%) the overall ¾2(i) would roughly imply the standard deviation of annualized
changes in wages observed in microstudies (Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk, 2009; Card and Hyslop,
1997). The other parameters are as in Figure 1.
25In reality, macroeconomic volatility of nominal GDP growth is likely to decline as in°ation comes
down, which would imply a steeper Phillips curve. However, the decline should be less than proportional
(mainly because of the real GDP component; see Benigno and Ricci, 2008, for simple supporting evidence),
so that even at zero in°ation volatility would persist. Moreover, the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks is
likely to be a®ected even less than the aggregate one when in°ation declines.































Figure 2: Long-run relationship between mean wage in°ation rate, E[¼w
1], and mean
output gap, E[y1 ¡ yf
1]; for di®erent standard deviations of nominal spending growth,
¾y. Variables in % at annual rates; ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01; ¾»(i) = ¾» = 10%.
improvement is four times larger if the volatility is reduced from 10% to 5% (for the same
level of in°ation), while it is more than three times larger if volatility declines from 5%
to 0% when the wage in°ation rate is at 1%.
A few additional implications arise from the model.26 First, the probability that
wages remain ¯xed depends on the level of in°ation and on the degree of macroeconomic
volatility. When wage in°ation is very low or the variance of the shocks is high, the
probability that wages remain rigid even upward is close to one. The probability declines
when in°ation increases (in line with the evidence of Card and Hyslop, 1997, that the
fraction of wages subject to rigidities is higher when in°ation is low), and it declines faster
when macroeconomic volatility is lower.
Second, a long run trade-o® between volatility of in°ation and volatility of output gap
emerges, for given distributions of the idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, at low in°ation there
is more adjustment via employment and less via wages, while the opposite emerges at
high in°ation. Trade-o®s of this nature have been generally assumed in monetary policy
analysis over the past thirty years (see Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon,
26Benigno and Ricci (2008) provide a more extensive discussion.
16¾y
¢E[y1 ¡ yf
1] 0% 2% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Reduction in E[¼w
1] from:
4% to 1% -4.3 -4.6 -6.0 -11.8 -22.4 -38.1
5% to 2% -1.0 -1.0 -1.4 -3.1 -6.6 -12.2
6% to 3% -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -1.2 -2.8 -5.5
Table 1: Changes in long-run mean output gap, ¢E[y1 ¡yf
1]; due to reductions in long-
run mean wage in°ation, ¢E[¼w
1]; for di®erent standard deviations of nominal spending




1] 1% 2% 3% 4% 5%
Reduction in ¾y from:
2% to 0% 0.28 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.01
5% to 0% 1.84 0.53 0.23 0.12 0.08
10% to 5% 6.24 2.00 0.92 0.51 0.32
15% to 10% 18.06 6.27 3.03 1.74 1.11
Table 2: Gains in long-run mean output gap, ¢E[y1 ¡ yf
1]; due to reductions in the
standard deviations of nominal spending growth, ¢¾y, for di®erent long-run mean wage
in°ation rates, E[¼w
1]. Variables in % at annual rates; ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01; ¾»(i) = ¾» =
10%.
1983). Woodford (2003) has recently provided microfoundation for these trade-o®s and for
their link to monetary reaction functions widely employed in in°ation-targeting models
(although he derives the trade-o® as a local approximation, while in our model it is a
feature of the global equilibria).
6 Relaxing the downward rigidity constraint
The benchmark model presented in the previous sections encompasses nominal wage rigidi-
ties as a constraint which is homogenous across agents and is independent of the level
of in°ation, the degree of macroeconomic volatility, or the presence of large shocks. The
reality is more nuanced, and this section explores various ways in which to relax this
17assumption. First, we consider the case in which the threshold for wage changes at which
downward wage rigidities become binding may be negative (rather than zero) and may
depend on in°ation and volatility. This corresponds to the idea that when agents expect
the constraint to be more relevant, they could adjust their behavior and set wages more
°exibly. Second, we allow for some heterogeneity, by considering the case in which only
some agents are subject to the constraint. Finally, we o®er a setup in which wage rigidities
may not be binding when high-variance shocks occur.
6.1 Varying the degree of downward rigidities
The main criticism of an approach that includes downward wage rigidities is that this
in°exibility should disappear as the in°ation rate declines toward zero (see the comments
to Akerlof et al., 1996, and Ball and Mankiw, 1994). As we discussed in the introduction,
there is now more evidence that downward wage rigidities persist even during low in°ation
periods. Nonetheless, it is valuable to explore the implications of a link between the degree
of downward rigidities and in°ation, by replacing the assumption dwt(j;i) ¸ 0 with
dwt(j;i) ¸ ¡·(µ;¾
2(i))wt(j;i)dt (24)
which nests the previous model. Nominal wages are now allowed to fall, but the percentage
decline cannot exceed ·(µ;¾2(i)), where ·(µ;¾2(i)) is a decreasing function of the mean
of nominal-spending growth, µ (so that at lower in°ation, wages can fall more), and also
an increasing function of the variance of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, ¾2(i)
(with higher variance wages can fall more). 27 The solution of the model is similar to the
previous case except that now µ should be replaced by ¸(µ;¾2(i)) ´ µ + ·(µ;¾2(i)).28 In

















since it is still true that E[¼w
1] = µ. Obviously the way in which the rigidities endogenously
decline (i.e. the functional form of ·(µ;¾2(i))) is crucial in shaping the Phillips curve. For
example if the percentage decline could not exceed a ¯xed amount ·1(hence ·(¢)=·1), then
the Phillips curve would simply shift down by ·1 (when compared to the one presented in
Figure 2). Under more general assumptions for ·(µ;¾2(i)), the e®ect of in°ation would be
27The relationship between wage setting and volatility is explored by Gray (1976).
28In this case, the condition ensuring that the probability distributions converge in the long run to
a non-trivial distribution becomes ¸(µ;¾2(i)) > 0. A supplementary appendix that presents the model
solution under this general case is available upon request.


























σy = 5% − Benchmark
σy = 10% − Benchmark
σy = 5%
σy = 10%
Figure 3: Long-run relationship between mean wage in°ation rate, E[¼w
1], and mean
output gap, E[y1 ¡ yf
1]; for di®erent standard deviations of nominal spending growth,
¾y, under both the benchmark case (wages cannot fall) and the alternative hypothesis in
which wages can fall according to rules (24) and (25). Variables in % at annual rates;
´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01, ·1 = 0:0894, ·2 = 3:5777 and ¾»(i) = ¾» = 10%:
to tilt the Phillips curve counter clockwise at low in°ation, while an increase in volatility
would steepen the curve (as the downward wage rigidities become less binding).29 For





¾2(i)(·1 ¡ ·2µ) (25)
for two di®erent levels of volatility, and compare these curves with the benchmark ones
from Figure 2.30 The cost of low in°ation in terms of output gap would decline, but would
remain non negligible. Reducing in°ation from 5% to 2% worsens the output gap by 0.6%
when ¾y = 5% and ¾»(i) = 10% compared to the benchmark case in which the reduction
29Obviously, if ·(µ;¾2(i)) were to be very large for any theta, then the Phillips curve would become
virtually vertical. However, as discussed extensively in the introduction, there is substantial evidence
that downward wage rigidities persist even at low in°ation.
30We set ·1 and ·2 such that ·1¾(i) = 1% at annual rates and ·2¾(i) = 0:1 under the assumption
¾y = 5% (for comparability, the same ·1 and ·2 are maintained when ¾y = 10%). Other parameters
as in Figure 2. Note that the various Phillips curves associated with di®erent levels of volatilities would
now cross, as a change in volatility not only shifts the curve outwards, but also steepens it.































Figure 4: Long-run relationship between mean wage in°ation rate, E[¼w
1], and mean
output gap, E[y1 ¡ yf
1]; for di®erent fraction (®) of sectors which are a®ected by the
downward rigidity constraint; (1¡®) is the fraction of sectors in which wages are °exible.
All variables in % and at annual rates; ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01; ¾y = 5% and ¾»(i) = 10%.
was 1.4%, and by 1.1% when ¾y = 10% compared to the benchmark case in which the
reduction was 3.1%.
6.2 Heterogeneous rigidities
This subsection allows for some heterogeneity in the way the rigidity a®ects agents, in line
with recent ¯ndings of Barattieri, Basu and Gottschalk (2009) suggesting the presence of
heterogeneity across occupations. To preserve simplicity, we make the assumption that a
fraction of wage setters, of type i and measure ® (0 · ® · 1), is constrained by downward
rigidities while the remaining fraction 1¡® can set wages °exibly. It can be easily shown
















where the only di®erence is that integrals are taken over a di®erent interval [0, ®), i.e.
across the sectors which are a®ected by downward-wage rigidities. The presence of some
20°exible wages generates a more vertical Phillips curve (see Figure 4 for various degrees of
wage °exibility in the case of moderate volatility, ¾y = 5%). Still the costs are signi¯cant
even when ® is small. For example, when ® is just 0:2, meaning that 20% of ¯rms are
constrained by downward wage rigidities, then lowering in°ation from 5% to 2% still
produce costs equal to 0.3% which are obviously smaller than the 1.4% found in the
benchmark case, but not negligible. The two boundary values for ® nest the models
presented in Sections 3 and 4: the °exible case when ® = 0, and the rigidity constraint
case when ® = 1.
6.3 Adjustment under high-variance shocks
This subsection extends the benchmark model to the case in which high-variance shocks
warrant a wage adjustment, by introducing two additional features. First, we assume,
on top of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, the presence of additional idiosyncratic
shocks that hit the individual wages less frequently but with large variations. When
wages are a®ected by such high-variance idiosyncratic shocks, wage setters can adjust
their wages either upward or downward in an optimal way. When instead agents do not
face these infrequent idiosyncratic shocks, they are subject to the usual downward wage
rigidity constraint.31
Second, we introduce the probability of switching between the low and the high prob-
ability regime, which captures the frequency of occurrence of high-variance shocks. This
is indeed an important parameter in order to study the relevance of the real e®ects of
monetary policy.32 If the large shocks were occurring very frequently, then wages would
adjust often and the Phillips curve would be quite vertical. With infrequent large shocks,
wages would be more subject to the downward wage rigidity constraint and the Phillips
curve would be °atter, as in the benchmark model. We will discuss below how micro-data
evidence on the frequency of wage adjustment and on the wage distribution can help to
discriminate between these two views.
To model such probability of switching, we add a process fstg that follows a two-state
31The idea that wages can adjust in a state-contingent way following high-variance shocks is borrowed
from the menu-cost literature on ¯rms' pricing (see in particular Gertler and Lehay, 2008, and Golosov
and Lucas, 2007). To preserve simplicity, we approximate the implications of an Ss model by introducing
a regime-switching model for the idiosyncratic shocks between a low and a high volatility regime. The
approximation is accurate to the extent to which an Ss model would trigger an adjustment for most of
the shocks of the high-volatility regime, which is more likely when the variance of such shocks is high.
32In the Golosov and Lucas (2007) model, large shocks are very frequent so the real e®ects of monetary
policy are small. On the contrary, Gertler and Lehay (2008) shows that with infrequent idiosyncratic
shocks is still possible to characterize the response of the economy to aggregate shocks through a Phillips
curve.
21Markov chain taking values 1 and 2. These two states are associated, respectively, with
the benchmark situation of downward wage rigidities and with the case in which wages
can freely adjust. We assume that the process fstg has matrix of transition probabilities
between time t and t + dt given by
"
1 ¡ ¸dt ¸dt
Ádt 1 ¡ Ádt
#
;
where ¸dt is the inter-period probability of switching from state 1 to state 2; 1 ¡ ¸dt is
the probability of remaining in state 1; Ádt is the probability of switching from state 2
to 1; and 1 ¡ Ádt is the probability of remaining in state 2.33 Given this structure, we
assume that the idiosyncratic shock »t(i) is now given by two multiplicative components,
»t(i) = »v;t(i)"t(i) where »v;t(i); as in the benchmark model, exhibits its logarithmic
distributed as a Brownian motion with zero drift and variance ¾2
»(i)
dln»v;t(i) = ¾»(i)dB»;t(i)
while the additional term is given by the shock "t(i) whose log is distributed as
dln"t(i) = ¾"(i;s)dBv;t(i)
where
¾"(i;s = 1) = 0
¾"(i;s = 2) > 0;
dBv;t(i) might be correlated with dB»;t(i); and both are standard Brownian motion with
zero mean and unitary variance. In state 1, the time-variation of the shock "t is zero so
that it does not move; in state 2, instead, its variation follows a Brownian motion with
variance ¾2
"(i):
In light of these two additions to the model, wage setters still maximize the objective
function (14) but now they take into account the possibility of freely adjusting wages when
state 2 occurs, while in state 1 they continue to face the downward rigidity constraint;
moreover, they anticipate the possibility of switching across states. Optimality conditions
requires that the derivative of the value function with respect to wages in state 2 is equal
to zero, i.e. Vw(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i);s = 2) = 0; since in this state is possible to relax
33It is assumed that 0 · ¸dt · 1 and 0 · Ádt · 1.
22the downward rigidity constraint, where now we have de¯ned ~ Yt(i) ´ ~ Yt»v;t(i)"t(i). In
state 1, instead, Vw(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i);s = 1) ¢ dwt(j;i) = 0 and dwt(j;i) ¸ 0 as in the
benchmark case since the downward wage rigidity constraint applies.
In state 1, the value function follows the following functional equation (see the Ap-
pendix)34





under the appropriate boundary conditions, where we have de¯ned the derivative of the
value function with respect to wages as v1(¢) ´ Vw(Wt(i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i);s = 1). By inspec-
tion, this is similar to the functional equation characterizing the benchmark model and
is associated with the same boundary conditions. The only di®erence is in the discount
factor which is now higher and given by (¸+½) because workers internalize the probability
of switching to the °exible-wage regime.35 It follows that in state 1, wages are set at the
level Wt(i) = c(µ;¾2(i);´;¸ + ½) ¢ ¹
1
1+´ ~ Yt»v;t(i)"t1(i) whenever dWt(i) ¸ 0, where "t1(i)
represents the realization of "t(i) at time t1; with t1 < t, which is the last time before t
at which state 2 occurred. In other words, desired wages are again proportional to the
°exible wages, but with a higher proportional factor: the same function ci(¢) now depends
on a higher discount factor (¸ + ½).
In state 2, instead, wages can be freely adjusted so that the derivative of the value
function with respect to wages is set to zero, v2(¢) = 0, and the optimality condition in
this state simpli¯es to
¼w(¢)dt + Áv1(¢)dt = 0; (27)
as it is shown in the appendix.36 However, this does not correspond to the optimality
condition under fully °exible wages since in state 2 wage setters take into account the
probability of reverting to state 1, given by Ádt. In the appendix, we show that wages in
state 2 are set proportionally to the level that would prevail in the permanently °exible-
wage case (W
f
t (i)) and such that Wt(i) = ~ ci(¢)¹
1
1+´ ~ Yt»t(i)"t(i), where now ci(¢) < ~ ci(¢).37
The results are quite intuitive. In state 1, i.e. when the downward rigidities are
binding, the desired wage is closer to the °exible-wage case than in the benchmark case
of Section 4, because agents internalize the positive probability of a readjustment when
34These are standard optimality conditions associated with problems of switching regimes. (See
Âksendald and Sulem, 2004, pp. 52-57.) See Dri±l et al. (2003) and Guo et al. (2005) for related
problems in the irreversible investment literature.
35The value function in state 2 does not enter into (26) because wages can freely adjust in that state.
36Notice that the composite state variable ~ Yt(i) is continuous when switching from state 2 to state 1,
but jumps from state 1 to state 2.
37We further note that the model of this section nests the benchmark model under the assumption that
¸dt = 0 and the °exible-wage model under the assumption that Ádt = 0.






















Figure 5: Frequency distribution function for wage changes, at annual rates, over a 4-
quarter horizon (¢4Wt(i)), 8-quarter horizon (¢8Wt(i)), 12-quarter horizon (¢12Wt(i))
and 16-quarter horizon (¢16Wt(i)): Model with Markov-switching regime, ¸dt = 0:06;
Ádt = 1. µ = 0:04 (annual rate) ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01; ¾y = 5% (annual rate), ¾»(i) = 10%
(annual rate); ¾"(i;s = 2) = 65% (annual rate).
the state switches. In state 2, i.e. when the downward rigidities are not binding, wage
setters will also internalize the fact that with positive probability they will enter state 1
in which the downward wage rigidity constraint is binding (indeed, as v1(¢) · 0, we obtain
¼w(¢) ¸ 0); hence they will set wages below the °exible-wage level, but above the case in
state 1.
The implications of this model for the steepness of the Phillips curve and for the
output gap-in°ation trade-o® depend crucially on ¸dt, i.e. the probability of switching
from the normal state where downward wage rigidities are binding to an exceptional state
where major shocks warrant wage °exibility. One can expect this parameter to be quite
low. For example, ¸dt = 0:1 would imply that wages become °exible during one quarter
out of two and a half years, while ¸dt = 0:01 would imply that wages becomes °exible
during one quarter out of twenty-¯ve years.
One way to calibrate ¸dt is to ask the model to match some key empirical patterns
uncovered by the micro literature on individual wage setting. For example, Card and
Hyslop (1997, table 2) show that in the presence of low in°ation the fraction of rigid






























Figure 6: Long-run relationship between mean wage in°ation rate, E[¼w
1], and mean
output gap, E[y1 ¡yf
1]; for di®erent probability, ¸dt; of switching from state 1, in which
all sectors are subject to the downward rigidity constraint, to state 2 in which wages can
be adjusted freely. All variables in % and at annual rates; ´ = 2:5; ½ = 0:01; ¾y = 5%,
¾»(i) = 10%, ¾"(i;s = 2) = 65%;Ádt = 1.
wages (zero change) at a one-year horizon is around 16%. The fraction decreases to 8%
at a two-year horizon and to 5% at a three-year horizon (during the period 1985-88, when
in°ation was about 3 percent). Moreover there are negative wage changes. In Figure 5 we
show the frequency distribution implied by our model for the wage changes over one-year,
two-year, three-year, four-year horizons, when we adopt the following calibration: µ = 4%,
¾y = 5% , ¾» = 10%; ¾"(i;s = 2) = 65%, all at annual rates, Ádt = 1, ½ = 0:01 on a
quarterly basis, and ´ = 2:5. The fraction of zero wage changes implied by the model over
the four horizons considered is 16.5%, 8.6%, 4.9%, and 3.8%, respectively, which is in
line with the evidence presented by Card and Hyslop. Moreover, the fraction of negative
wage changes on a year horizon is equal to 11% (or less than 3% on a quarterly basis), so
that our model is consistent with some wage decreases. To get these results, we calibrate
¸dt = 0:06:
In Figure 6, we allow ¸dt to vary in the (0:00;0:12) interval, i.e. a range surrounding
the value calibrated above, in order to study the implications of this model for the shape
25of the long-run Phillips curve.38 When the probability of switching to state 2 increases,
wages are on average more °exible: the Phillips curve moves inward and becomes more
vertical. In the case of ¸dt = 0:06 , reducing in°ation from 5% to 2% would increase
the output gap by about 0.3 percent of GDP, about 1 percentage point less than in the
benchmark case, but still by a sizable amount. For countries or during period where the
high variance shocks are more (less) frequent, hence ¸dt is higher (lower), the trade-o®
would be better (worse) and the costs would be lower (higher).
7 Conclusions
This paper o®ers a theoretical foundation for the long-run Phillips curve, by introducing
downward nominal wage rigidities in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with forward-looking agents and °exible-goods prices. Downward nominal rigidities (the
main di®erence with respect to current monetary models) have been advocated for a long
time as a justi¯cation for the Phillips curve, and have recently received theoretical and
empirical support (see discussion in the introduction).
The model generates a closed-form solution uncovering a highly non-linear relationship
for the long-run trade-o® between average wage in°ation and output gap: the trade-o®
is virtually inexistent at high in°ation rates, while it becomes relevant in a low in°ation
environment. The relation shifts with several factors, and in particular with the degree
of macroeconomic volatility.39 In a country with signi¯cant macroeconomic stability, the
Phillips curve is virtually vertical also at low in°ation. However, a country with moder-
ate to high volatility may face a substantial costs in terms of output and employment if
attempting to reach price stability. Higher productivity growth would tend to make the
Phillips curve more vertical, as it would feed into higher nominal spending growth. The
Phillips curve would also steepen if the degree of wage rigidities declines. Indeed, the
benchmark model is extended to allow for the possibility that downward wage rigidities
may be heterogenous across agents, and may be endogenous to in°ation, macro-volatility,
or to the occurrence of large shocks. Nonetheless, for reasonable parameter values, down-
ward rigidities continue to generate a non-negligible long run trade o® between in°ation
and the output gap. Further work would be necessary to achieve a deeper understanding
38In particular we assume that ¾y = 5% and ¾» = 10% at annual rates whereas ¾"(i;s = 2) = 65% at
annual rates. Note that the latter assumption does not a®ect the shape of the long-run Phillips curve.
We also assume that Ádt = 1 meaning that that state 2 is not persistent at all and once a high-variance
shock occurs then the state switches back immediately to state 1:
39With respect to the other parameters of the model, the Phillips curve would °atten when labor
elasticity is lower and agents heavily discount the future; and it would shift outward if labor and goods
market competition weakens.
26of the labor market and of the wage setting behavior, which is crucial to assess the extent
and the implications of downward wage rigidities.
Several important implications arise. First, the optimal in°ation rate may not be zero,
but positive, as in°ation helps achieving the intratemporal and intertemporal relative price
adjustments, especially in countries with substantial macroeconomic volatility. Second,
the ideal in°ation rate would di®er across countries (and in particular it would be higher
in countries with larger macroeconomic volatility), and may change over time. Third,
stabilization policies, can play a crucial role, as they can improve the in°ation-output
trade-o®.
Additional theoretical implication arise. First, the overall degree of wage rigidity
is endogenously stronger at low in°ation rates and disappears at high in°ation rates,
unlike in time-dependent models of price rigidities where prices remain sticky even in a
high-in°ation environment. This arises from the endogenous tendency for upward wage
rigidities (as in Elsby, 2009), resulting from forward looking agents anticipating the e®ect
of downward rigidities on their future employment opportunities. Second, this endogenous
wage rigidity introduces a trade-o® also between the volatility of the output gap and the
volatility of in°ation, as at low in°ation adjustments occurs mainly via changes in output
and at high in°ation via change in wages. Third, the Phillips curve may arise not only
from the need for intratemporal relative price adjustment across sectors in the presence of
downward rigidities (as in the traditional view), but also from the need for intertemporal
relative price adjustment, which opens the way for the important role of macroeconomic
stabilization policies discussed above. Fourth, nominal shocks can have high persistent
real e®ects, suggesting that introducing downward wage in°exibility in menu-cost model
¶ a la Golosov and Lucas (2007) would likely change their conclusion that nominal shocks
have only transient e®ects on real activity at any level of in°ation. Fifth, prolonged
periods of low in°ation or de°ation may prove very costly in terms of output and possibly
employment, a result which is consistent with the Japanese experience according to Yasui
and Takenaka (2005).
Regarding the empirical implications, the long run output gap with respect to the
°exible-wage output is not zero in our model, but depends on the extent of in°ation and
volatility of the economy. This implies that standard empirical methods deriving an esti-
mate of the output gap as a deviation from ¯ltering series may be misleading, as such a
measure would, by construction, average out to about zero in the long run. Indeed, in our
model, the long run output gap should simply be a mirror image of the unemployment
rate above the frictionless unemployment rate. Moreover, empirical studies of the Phillips
curve might prove inaccurate unless they properly account for macroeconomic volatility,
27especially in a low in°ation environment. For example, the \Great Moderation" experi-
enced by the U.S. until recently may have signi¯cantly steepened the Phillips curve over
the past two decades, thus potentially strengthening the case for the conventional view
of a vertical long-run curve in this country. However, this does not need to apply to
periods where volatility becomes persistently higher or to countries with generally higher
macroeconomic instability.
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31A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of conditions (17)
Let W the space of non-decreasing non-negative stochastic processes fwt(j;i)g. This is
the space of processes that satisfy the constraint (16). First we show that the objective
function is concave over a convex set. To show that the set is convex, note that if x 2 W







and ¼(¢) is concave in the ¯rst-argument, the objective function is concave in fwt(j;i)g
since it is the integral of concave functions.
Let fw¤
t(j;i)g be a process belonging to W that maximizes (14) and V (¢) the associated
value function de¯ned by









We now characterize the properties of the optimal process fw¤
t(j;i)g: The Bellman equa-
tion for the wage-setter problem can be written as
½V (wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dt = max
dwt(j;i)
¼(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dt+EtfdV (wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))g
(A.1)
subject to
dwt(j;i) ¸ 0: (A.2)
At optimum we search for a process fw¤
t(j;i)g that satis¯es
Vw(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) = 0 if dwt(j;i) > 0;
Vw(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) · 0 if dwt(j;i) = 0:
Di®erentiating (A.1) with respect to wt(j;i) we get
½Vw(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dt = ¼w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dt + EtfdVw(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))g
(A.3)
32where



















with kw ´ 1 ¡ µw: Since the objective is concave and the set of constraints is convex and
each household j faces the same problem in supplying variety i, the optimal choice for
wt(j;i) is unique. It follows that wt(j;i) = Wt(i) for each j: We can then write (A.3) as
½v(Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dt = ¼w(Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dt + Etfdv(Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))g (A.4)
where













and we have de¯ned v(Wt; ~ Yt) ´ Vw(Wt;Wt; ~ Yt): Using Ito's Lemma we can write

















since dwt(j;i) has ¯nite variation and so also dWt(i) implying (dWt(i))2 = dWt(i)d~ Yt = 0.
We have de¯ned µ
0(i) ´ µ+ 1
2¾2(i) and ¾2(i) ´ ¾2
y+¾2
»(i). From the ¯rst to the second line,
we have used the super-contact conditions (see Dixit, 1991, and Dumas, 1991) requiring
vw(Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dWt(i) = 0:
It follows that we can write (A.4) as









since we have noticed that v(Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) = ~ v(~ Yw;t(i))=Wt with ~ Yw;t(i) ´ ~ Yt(i)=Wt and
¼w(Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) = ~ ¼w(~ Yw;t(i))=Wt where







33The problem boils down to looking for a function ~ v(~ Yw;t(i)) and a regulating barrier
^ c(i) such that ~ v(~ Yw;t(i)) · 0 and
~ v(1=^ c(i)) = 0 (A.6)
~ vy(1=^ c(i)) = 0: (A.7)














while in this case the complementary solution has the form
v
c(~ Yw;t(i)) = ~ Y
°(i)
w;t (i)














When ~ Yw;t(i) ! 0, the length of time until the next wage adjustment can be made
arbitrarily long with probability arbitrarily close to one, then it should be the case that
lim
~ Yw;t(i)!0
[~ v(~ Yw;t(i)) ¡ ~ v
p(~ Yw;t(i))] = 0
which requires that °(i) should be positive. The general solution is then given by the sum
of the particular and the complementary solution















for a constant k(i) to be determined. Moreover
~ vy(~ Yw;t(i)) = ¡
kw(1 + ´)
½ ¡ µ















0(i)(1 + ´) ¡ 1
2(1 + ´)´¾2(i)
¹^ c(i)
¡(1+´) + ki^ c(i)




0(i)(1 + ´) ¡ 1
2(1 + ´)´¾2(i)
¹^ c(i)
¡(1+´) + °k(i)^ c(i)
¡°(i) = 0: (A.12)
From the last two set of conditions we can determine k(i) and ^ c(i): In particular,
^ c(i) = (¹)
1
1+´c(i) where c(i) is given by
ci(¢) ´
µ
















2(°(µ;¾2(i);½) + ´ + 1)¾2(i)
¶ 1
1+´
which shows that 0 < c(µ;¾2(i);´;½) · 1.
35A.2 Derivation of equations (26) and (27).
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in state 1 is given by
½V1(¢)dt = ¼(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dt + V1;w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dwt(j;i)
















where V1(¢) = V1(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) which results from the standard application of
Ito's Lemma, with the addition of the last two terms that account for the possibility of
switching to state 2 where ~ Y 0
t(i) denotes the level of the state variable ~ Yt(i) in state 2.
In deriving the above equation, we have used the fact that in state 1, dwt(j;i) has ¯nite
variation implying (dwt(j;i))2 = dwt(j;i)dWt(i) = dwt(j;i)d~ Yt(i) = 0. At the optimum,
V1;w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dwt(j;i) = 0. Di®erentiating the above equation with respect to
wt(j;i), we obtain
½V1;w(¢)dt = ¼w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dt + V1;Ww(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))EtdWt(i)













+V1;yWw(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))EtdWt(i)d~ Yt(i) +
¸V2;w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Y
0
t(i))dt ¡ ¸V1;w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dt:
We can now use the fact that the equilibrium will be symmetric across all j, so that
dwt(j;i) = dWt(i) which implies that also dWt(i) has ¯nite variation. We can then
simplify the above expression to





v1;yy(Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))~ Y
2
t (i)¾




where we have de¯ned v1;w(Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) ´ V1;w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Yt(i)) and used the smooth-
pasting condition v1;w(Wt(i); ~ Yt(i))dWt(i) = 0: Finally, noting that v2;w(Wt(i); ~ Y 0
t(i)) = 0
in state 2 because wage setters can adjust their wages, we can then obtain equation (26)
in the text.
36The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in state 2 is given by
½V2(¢)dt = ¼(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Y
0



















































t(i))dt ¡ ÁV2(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Y
0
t(i))dt:








v(i) and noted that the state variable ~ Y 0
t(i) from state 2 to 1 is continuos.
Optimality condition requires V2;w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Y 0
t(i)) = 0 (and so they are zero also
the second derivatives) and simpli¯es the above condition to
½V2(¢)dt = ¼(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Y
0

































t(i))dt ¡ ÁV2(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Y
0
t(i))dt:
By taking the derivative with respect to wt(j;i) and noting that the resulting equilibrium
is symmetric we can obtain
½v2(Wt(i); ~ Y
0
t(i))dt = ¼w(Wt(i); ~ Y
0































t(i))dt ¡ Áv2(Wt(i); ~ Y
0
t(i))dt;
where we have de¯ned v2(Wt(i); ~ Y 0
t(i)) ´ V2;w(wt(j;i);Wt(i); ~ Y 0
t(i)). Since v2(Wt(i); ~ Y 0
t(i)) =
370 together with all the derivatives we can get
¼w(Wt(i); ~ Y
0
t(i)) + Áv1(Wt(i); ~ Y
0
t(i)) = 0 (A.13)
which is condition (27) in the text.














(½ + ¸) ¡ µ

















where we have used the results of the previous subsection of the appendix. Indeed they
still apply to derive v1(Wt(i); ~ Y 0
t(i)) as discussed in the text with the caveat that now the
total discount factor to is (½ + ¸) instead of ½. Clearly, a solution of the above equation
is of the form
Wt(i) = ~ c(i)~ Yt»t(i)"t(i)
which determines the wages in sector i in state 2 where ~ ci solves the equation
£







(½ + ¸) ¡ µ















(½ + ¸) ¡ µ




Note again that in state 1, in the case of adjustment, wages are adjusted to
Wt(i) = ^ c(i)~ Yt»t(i)"t1(i)
where "t1(i) represent the realization of "t at time t1 < t, which is the last time before t










2(°(µ;¾2(i);½ + ¸) + ´ + 1)¾2(i)
¶ 1
1+´
(¹)
1
1+´:
38